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99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021)

Preemption Problem: Does ERISA Preempt the California Consumer
Privacy Act? *
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”) to ensure that when private employers establish benefit plans for
their employees, they keep their promise to provide those benefits. This
comprehensive regulatory scheme governs benefits administration, establishes
plan reporting requirements, and defines fiduciary duties for those involved in
plan administration and decision-making. But ERISA is silent on a key issue
affecting plan participants and sponsors today—data privacy and security.
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), enacted in 2018 and effective
beginning January 1, 2020, represents the most comprehensive data privacy law
in the United States. If the CCPA applies to ERISA plans, it will force plan
sponsors and administrators to strengthen their data security protocols,
increasing participants’ data security and consumer rights while also increasing
plan administration costs. But whether the CCPA applies to ERISA plans
remains an open question.
ERISA may preempt the CCPA if a court were to find that the CCPA
impermissibly interferes with the administration of ERISA plan benefits. If
ERISA preempts the entire CCPA, plans would be exempted from compliance
with generally applicable state data privacy laws that would otherwise improve
plan security and therefore benefit plan participants. This Comment argues that
because ERISA does not create an explicit duty for plans to reasonably safeguard
data and the CCPA applies generally, courts should allow for provisions of the
law that are not directly connected with employee benefits administration to
escape preemption.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 790
I.
THE EVOLUTION OF ERISA PREEMPTION ........................... 795
A. The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Application of Section 514
Express Preemption Perpetuates Uncertainty in This Area....... 797
B. State Law Claims for Tortious Invasion of Privacy Have Not
Been Preempted by ERISA ................................................. 801
C. State Data Breach Laws Likely Escape ERISA Preemption..... 802
D. ERISA Plan Fiduciaries May Have a Duty To Reasonably
Protect Participant Data .................................................... 804

* © 2021 Katherine Q. Morrow.

99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021)

790

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

II.
III.

THE CCPA AND ERISA ........................................................ 806
ERISA MAY PREEMPT THE CCPA BECAUSE OF THE STATE
LAW’S BROAD SCOPE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PLAN
ADMINISTRATION ................................................................. 809
A. ERISA Likely Does Not Completely Preempt the CCPA and Other
State Data Privacy Laws Because Data Privacy Is Not a Plan
Benefit ............................................................................. 810
B. Whether ERISA Section 514(a) Expressly Preempts the CCPA
Depends on How Broadly a Court Interprets “Relates to” ........ 812
IV. THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION ........................................ 814
A. Obligations Imposed by the CCPA May Extend Beyond ERISA’s
Fiduciary Duty ................................................................. 814
B. The CCPA’s General Applicability May Save It from
Preemption ....................................................................... 816
C. A Likely Outcome: Partial Preemption ................................. 817
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 818
INTRODUCTION
As of June 2020, 401(k) retirement plans in the United States held an
estimated $6.3 trillion in assets. 1 As work and communications become
increasingly virtual, these retirement assets become more vulnerable to data
breach and cyber fraud. 2 In the event of a cyberattack or data breach, plan
beneficiaries may potentially hold the plan administrators and fiduciaries liable,
but the applicable law and the extent of its protection remains unsettled. 3
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 4
regulates employer-sponsored pension and healthcare plans. Congress passed
ERISA to promote these plans and ensure that policyholders receive full
benefits even if their employer becomes insolvent. 5 One of ERISA’s primary

1. Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plan Research, INV. CO. INST., https://www.ici.org/
policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [https://perma.cc/7V2F-4TA9] (last updated Oct. 2020).
2. See Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, Insight: Coping with 401(k) Cyberattacks and Fraudulent Plan
Distributions, BLOOMBERG L. (June 18, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employeebenefits/insight-coping-with-401k-cyberattacks-and-fraudulent-plan-distributions [https://perma.cc/
UPR5-KQKK].
3. See Gregg Moran, Breaches Within Breaches: The Crossroads of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibilities
and Data Security, 73 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 485–87 (2019).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and
29 U.S.C.).
5. See id. § 2, 88 Stat. at 833 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)). ERISA was passed
partly in response to large businesses failing and being unable to pay pension benefits to their
employees because the plans were not adequately funded. Robert A. Cohen, Note, Understanding
Preemption Removal Under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578, 588 (1997). Congress wanted to ensure
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goals was to facilitate uniform administration of pension and healthcare plans 6
nationwide, and it contains two preemption 7 provisions to achieve this goal. 8
Generally, ERISA may preempt a state law if it (1) conflicts with ERISA’s civil
enforcement scheme 9 or (2) if the state law “relates to” an ERISA plan such
that it would interfere with the uniform administration of the plan. 10 ERISA’s
broad preemption standard allows for covered plans to avoid potential liability
under state laws that impact the administration of the plan’s benefits; however,
the Supreme Court’s inconsistent interpretation of the ERISA preemption
standard makes it notoriously difficult to predict whether preemption applies
in a given scenario.
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, data privacy and data security
were not issues on the national radar. At that time, the most advanced piece of
related technology in ERISA administration was the fax machine, and plans
mailed communications and distributed disbursements by check. 11 Today, plan
participants most frequently interact with their plans online, transmitting
personally identifiable information (“PII”), which puts participants’
information at risk in the event of a data breach. 12 ERISA’s text does not
address plan participants’ rights to a cause of action in the event of a data breach
nor does it address participants’ data privacy rights. Although several federal
that older workers who planned to receive retirement funds from pension plans would actually receive
those funds. Id.
6. See § 4, 88 Stat. at 839 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)). ERISA generally covers
any employee benefit plan that is established or maintained “by any employer engaged in commerce or
in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or “by any employee organization or organizations
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or
“by both.” Id. Pension plans are plans that provide retirement income to workers, while welfare plans
provide other benefits such as healthcare, disability, death, or unemployment benefits to workers, but
not retirement income. Cohen, supra note 5, at 589.
7. Preemption occurs when a state law is displaced by a federal statute. See Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2000). The Supreme Court has developed a framework to
analyze preemption. Id. at 226. A federal law may preempt state law in three ways by: (1) including a
preemption clause expressly withdrawing power from the states (express preemption), (2) regulating
an area so completely that it “withdraws state lawmaking power over that field” (field preemption), or
(3) conflicting with the state law (conflict preemption). Id. at 226–29.
8. See infra Part I.
9. For example, a plaintiff’s suit against their pension plan for failure to properly disburse
benefits would be preempted because ERISA provides a remedy in this situation. See, e.g., Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004) (“[I]f an individual, at some point in time, could have
brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty
that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).”).
10. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
11. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, PRIVACY AND
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 5 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/
sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2011-privacy-and-security-issuesaffecting-employee-benefit-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG9W-9WSN].
12. See id.

99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021)

792

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

laws require financial services providers to secure PII, these laws do not directly
apply to benefit plans or the sensitive data that these plans hold. 13 In the
absence of a comprehensive federal consumer data privacy law, 14 states have
adopted their own data privacy legislation which has created a nationwide
patchwork of different data privacy laws. 15
On January 1, 2020, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(“CCPA” or the “Act”) 16 went into effect, imposing strict consumer data
13. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); The Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681); and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681; 20 U.S.C. § 9701-08), all address data security for
financial services, but do not extend to ERISA plans. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE &
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, CYBERSECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR BENEFIT PLANS 7
(2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2016cybersecurity-considerations-for-benefit-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG9W-9WSN].
14. The Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58), allows the Federal Trade Commission to bring enforcement actions
against companies who engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices or fail to establish adequate
protections of consumer data. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE:
2018, at 5 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKD4-ZFGD]. However, the
Federal Trade Commission Act does not mandate the comprehensive reporting and disclosure
requirements that the CCPA requires and serves more as an enforcement mechanism of specific federal
legislation, rather than a comprehensive data privacy law. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J.
Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2299 (2015)
(making the case for the Federal Trade Commission to expand its enforcement role and take a more
progressive stance on developing comprehensive data protection standards).
15. See 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumerdata-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/FSK3-T6VF].
16. Ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
.199.100 (2020)). On November 3, 2020, California passed the California Privacy Rights Act
(“CPRA” or “Proposition 24”) by ballot initiative. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020,
Proposition 24 (Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199.100 (2020)); see F. Paul
Pittman & Kyle Levenberg, Before the Dust Settles: The California Privacy Rights Act Ballot Initiative
Modifies and Expands California Privacy Law, WHITE & CASE TECH. NEWSFLASH (Nov. 13,
2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/dust-settles-california-privacy-rights-act-ballotinitiative-modifies-and [https://perma.cc/62YF-A2U2]. The CPRA strengthens the CCPA by
establishing the California Privacy Protection Agency, expanding consumer rights, altering the thirtyday cure period, and implementing a variety of additional data privacy and security requirements. See
Pittman & Levenberg, supra. Most provisions of the CPRA become operative on January 1, 2023, with
a one-year look back period for data collected in 2022. Proposition 24 § 31. The CPRA also extended
the CCPA’s exemption of employee data until January 1, 2023, giving employers, and consequently
employer-sponsored ERISA plans, an additional year to comply. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.145(m)(1), (n)(1) (2020); see Anna Park, Zoe Argento & Philip Gordon, Substantial New Privacy
Obligations for California Employers: The California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act Passes at the Polls,
LITTLER INSIGHT (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/substantialnew-privacy-obligations-california-employers-california [https://perma.cc/AJS7-2PEW]. Because the
CCPA serves as the underlying framework for the CPRA, this Comment will refer to the CCPA when
discussing the current state of California privacy law.
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security and reporting requirements on covered businesses in California. 17 The
Act focuses on three core consumer privacy rights: (1) the right to know about
the personal information a business collects and how it uses and shares the
information, 18 (2) the right to delete personal information collected by
businesses (with some exceptions), 19 and (3) the right to opt out of the sale of
personal information. 20 Companies that do business 21 in California and collect
consumers’ personal information must comply with the Act if they: (1) have
annual gross revenues over $25 million; (2) annually buy, receive, or share for
commercial purposes the personal information of over 50,000 consumers; 22 or
17. See Rachel Myrow, California Rings in the New Year with a New Data Privacy Law, NPR (Dec.
30, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/30/791190150/california-rings-in-the-new-yearwith-a-new-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/5ASZ-FKRD] (describing the CCPA as “the toughest
data privacy law in the U.S.”); cf. Mary Stone Ross, I Helped Draft California’s New Privacy Law. Here’s
Why It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, FAST CO. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90444501/ihelped-draft-californias-new-privacy-law-heres-why-it-doesnt-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/Z4EK
-5RXL] (arguing that although the CCPA is the “strictest privacy law in the country,” it does not go
far enough due to a weakened enforcement scheme). Although the CCPA is regarded as the strictest
privacy law in the United States, it is considered less strict than the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119). Heather Kelly, California Passes Strictest Online Privacy Law in the
Country, CNN (June 29, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/28/technology/californiaconsumer-privacy-act/index.html [https://perma.cc/A6A4-4PWH].
18. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1810–11 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(a)–
(b) (2020)).
19. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1810 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a), (d)
(2020)).
20. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1811–12 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a)
(2020)).
21. The CCPA does not explicitly state what it means to “do business” in California, but the
California Tax Code and judicial decisions regarding whether out-of-state companies need to register
to do business in the state and whether California courts have jurisdiction over out-of-state companies
likely answer this question. Matthew Stein & Christopher Lisy, Insight: Figuring Out if You Are ‘Doing
Business’ in California Under the CCPA, BLOOMBERG L.: PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020,
4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-figuring-out-if-you-aredoing-business-in-california-under-the-ccpa [https://perma.cc/9EP2-UHN7]. The California Tax
Code defines “doing business” as actively engaging in a transaction with the purpose of earning a profit,
and it does not include passive investments that yield dividends. See Swart Enters. Inc. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 670, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). If a company is not required to register with
the California Secretary of State as a non-California company doing business in California, then it may
not qualify as doing business in the state under the CCPA. Stein & Lisy, supra. Finally, companies that
“purposefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities in [California]” are likely
subject to the state courts’ jurisdiction and may qualify as doing business in the state. Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).
22. Originally, the threshold was 50,000 consumers, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) (2020)), but the CPRA increased the threshold to
100,000, operative as of January 1, 2023, see California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 14
(Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) (2020)); Pittman & Levenberg, supra
note 16.
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(3) derive 50% or more of their annual revenues from selling personal
information. 23 Because employee benefit plans collect personal information
such as names and addresses of benefit recipients, their spouses, and their
dependents, the CCPA would likely cover these plans if they operate in
California and meet one of the threshold requirements. 24
Prior to and upon its passage, speculation regarding how this landmark
privacy legislation would impact employee benefit plans abounded. 25 However,
analysis of the legal impact of this law on employers and businesses who store
and use employee personal information, specifically employee benefit plans
covered by ERISA, does not arrive at a conclusive answer. Commentators
uniformly state that ERISA may preempt the CCPA, either completely or
partially. 26 Analyzing the arguments for and against ERISA preemption of the
CCPA will allow employers and plan administrators to better understand their
legal obligations and predict risks associated with noncompliance. As data
privacy becomes an increasingly litigated issue, courts will need to determine
whether ERISA imposes a duty on employers to reasonably safeguard consumer
data or whether the issue should be left to the states, which generally craft
stricter privacy requirements.
Since ERISA’s enactment, courts have grappled with the expansive nature
of its preemption clause and its implications for state tort litigation, healthcare
23. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as amended
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (2020)) (defining businesses covered by the CCPA).
24. Id.; see Norbert F. Kugele, Employment Data, Employee Benefits, and the CCPA, WARNER
NORCROSS + JUDD (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.wnj.com/Publications/Employment-Data-EmployeeBenefits-and-the-CCPA [https://perma.cc/A96H-C5AK].
25. See, e.g., THEODORE P. AUGUSTINOS, LAURA L. FERGUSON & EMILY HOLPERT, CCPA
GUIDE: DOES PERSONAL INFORMATION INCLUDE EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
DATA? 2 (2019), https://www.lockelord.com/-/media/privacy20190405ccpa-guide-does-personalinformatio.pdf?la=en&hash=3F74614B42724A2AA774B514F236B9A8
[https://perma.cc/A9UYZERG] (explaining that “ERISA-covered benefit plans that are not HIPAA-covered (such as
retirement, long term disability, life and AD&D) may be able to successfully argue that personal
information collected and used in connection with such plans are not subject to the requirements of the
CCPA” under ERISA’s preemption jurisprudence); CCPA: Employers Should Consider Implications for
Employee Benefit Plans, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIV. & INFO. SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/01/16/ccpa-employers-should-consider-implications-foremployee-benefit-plans/ [https://perma.cc/PXC2-RNCF] (“In the absence of further guidance,
however, it is not certain to what extent preemption would apply – and it is also possible that a court
could find that ERISA preempts some aspects of the law but not others.”); Lisa Sotto, Jessica Agostinho
& Danielle Dobrusin, Where Calif. Privacy Law and Employee Benefits Data Collide, LAW360 (Feb. 14,
2019, 3:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1127571/where-calif-privacy-law-and-employeebenefits-data-collide [https://perma.cc/4NJW-T2WA (dark archive)] (“In the absence of further
guidance, however, it is not certain to what extent preemption might apply . . . .”).
26. See Kugele, supra note 24. Their reluctance to come down on one side of ERISA preemption
is likely because the law is unclear and untested in this area. Id. (“For programs subject to ERISA,
there is certainly an argument that CCPA is preempted by ERISA—but California has a history of
challenging ERISA preemption claims, and until courts work through that issue, it’s an open
question.”).
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administration, employment regulation, and general regulation of welfare and
benefits plans. 27 But the question of whether state data privacy laws will be
preempted by ERISA remains unanswered.
This Comment addresses ERISA’s potential preemption of the CCPA in
four parts. Part I discusses the evolution of the Supreme Court’s ERISA
preemption doctrine to provide context on how courts may rule on this
question. Part II examines the CCPA generally and how it could impact the
administration of ERISA plans. Part III presents arguments for preemption of
the CCPA. Finally, Part IV argues that a likelier outcome is ERISA preempting
only the parts of the CCPA that directly interfere with benefits administration.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ERISA PREEMPTION
Over the past thirty-seven years, the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption
jurisprudence has “play[ed] like an accordion with intermittent expansive
interpretations and narrow interpretations.” 28 This part describes (1) ERISA’s
two methods of preemption; (2) how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
statute has changed over time, pivoting from an expansive view of preemption
to a narrower one; and (3) ERISA preemption doctrine in the context of
invasion of privacy and data breach litigation.
ERISA can preempt a state law in two ways: complete preemption and
express preemption. Complete preemption occurs when ERISA’s text provides
for civil enforcement to the absolute exclusion of other state law remedies. If a
plaintiff is eligible to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of ERISA, 29
which provides a method for beneficiaries to sue to recover benefits owed under
the plan or for breach of fiduciary duty, 30 then any state action is completely

27. See, e.g., Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334
(1997) (holding that California’s prevailing wage law and apprenticeship programs were not preempted
by ERISA); De Buono v. NYSA ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (holding
that a state tax on hospitals operated by ERISA funds was not preempted under section 514(a));
Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “state claims
for invasion of privacy, negligence, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and medical privacy violations
are not preempted”).
28. Sharon Reece, The Accordion Type Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption Creates Unnecessary
Uncertainty, 88 UMKC L. REV. 115, 124 (2019).
29. If the plaintiff can prove that an independent legal duty exists outside of the duties imposed
by ERISA, then section 502 may not preempt the claim. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200, 201 (2004).
30. Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows a beneficiary to bring a civil action to “enforce his rights under
the . . . plan.” Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B),
88 Stat. 829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). A beneficiary may also bring a
civil action under section 502(a)(1)(B) to enforce the fiduciary duties owed to him under section 404(a)
of the plan. Id.; see also § 404(a), 88 Stat. at 877–78 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104) (detailing
the fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries under ERISA).
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preempted. 31 For example, a plan participant may sue under
section 502(a)(1)(B) if their employer refuses to provide benefits entitled to
them under the plan. 32 If the plan participant brings the claim in state court, it
will be removed to federal court through a process known as complete
preemption. 33
Under section 502(a)’s complete preemption standard, a “state-law cause
of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants ERISA’s civil enforcement
remedy conflicts with clear congressional intent to make that remedy exclusive,
and is therefore pre-empted.” 34 If a state cause of action falls under ERISA’s
section 502 civil enforcement scheme, it is converted to a federal cause of action
and removed to federal court. 35 For example, if plan beneficiaries bring state
claims against their ERISA-covered plan administrator for failure to use
ordinary care in the administration of benefits, then the state claims are
preempted by section 502, which allows beneficiaries to directly bring suits in
federal court to recover benefits due under the plan. 36
ERISA does not specifically provide a remedy in the event of data breach
or breach of privacy, likely because data breach as it occurs today was not a
concern in 1974. 37 Instead, ERISA’s civil enforcement remedy deals with
effective management and administration of benefits. 38 Unless an individual
can successfully argue that data security is a benefit as defined by ERISA and
is covered by ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, section 502 likely does not
apply to consumers’ data security and claims related to data breach.
31. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 201 (“If an individual . . . could have brought his claim
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), . . . the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B).”).
32. § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 891.
33. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 200 (citing Beneficial Nat’l. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1,
8 (2003)).
34. Id. at 200–01.
35. Id. at 209.
36. See id. at 212–14 (holding that the plaintiffs’ state law claims alleging lack of care when making
healthcare benefits decisions were preempted by section 502(a) of ERISA). If a plaintiff brings a claim
under section 502 (rather than a state law tort claim), they may only obtain denied benefits and not
punitive damages even if they were denied benefits in bad faith or by a tortious act. See Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53–54 (1987) (“Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a
declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator’s
improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or beneficiary may also bring a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty, and under this cause of action may seek removal of the fiduciary.”).
37. ERISA does not explicitly require fiduciaries to protect against data breach, but it does
establish a general duty for the fiduciary to “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(A), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)). Fiduciaries may face personal liability for any plan losses
resulting from a breach of duty. See id. § 409(a), 88 Stat. at 886 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)).
38. See id. § 502, 88 Stat. at 891–93 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132).
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The second and most debated method of ERISA preemption, express
preemption, is located in section 514(a). Section 514(a) of ERISA explicitly
preempts all state laws “insofar as they may . . . relate to an employee benefit
plan.” 39 ERISA does not define the meaning of relates to but does exclude
several areas of state law from preemption, including state banking, securities,
and insurance laws, as well as “generally applicable criminal laws.” 40 Due to the
lack of explicit statutory guidance regarding the scope of what relates to
employee benefit plans, express preemption has been applied inconsistently.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Application of Section 514 Express
Preemption Perpetuates Uncertainty in This Area

ERISA section 514(a) preempts state laws that relate to an ERISAcovered employee benefit plan. 41 Although Congress intended for this
preemption clause to apply broadly, 42 the Supreme Court has limited the
breadth of relate to preemption, reasoning that “[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to
extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical
purposes pre-emption would never run its course.” 43 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has further defined the boundaries of relates to as when the
state’s law “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where
the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.” 44 A state law
may also relate to ERISA plans if it has an “impermissible connection with” the
plan such that the law impacts a “central matter of plan administration.” 45
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption jurisprudence considers
both the interaction between the potentially preempted state law and the
ERISA plan, as well as the state law’s impact on the ERISA plan.
The Supreme Court first addressed section 514(a) ERISA preemption in
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 46 In Shaw, the plaintiffs challenged ERISA
preemption of New York’s Human Rights Law. 47 The state law required
39. Id.§ 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
40. Id. § 514(b), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)).
41. Id. § 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
42. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (discussing the need for a broad
preemption standard to promote “uniformity with respect to interstate plans” and to prevent “the
possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action”); see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (discussing how the Court has applied ERISA preemption to “ensure
that ERISA’s express pre-emption clause receives the broad scope Congress intended while avoiding
the clause’s susceptibility to limitless application”).
43. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655
(1995).
44. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
45. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
46. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
47. Id. at 92.
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employers to pay benefits to employees who were unable to work due to
pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities. 48 Delta argued that because its
benefits plans were covered by ERISA, ERISA preempted the state law. 49 The
Court held that any state law relates to a benefit plan if it “has a connection
with or reference to” a plan. 50 Under this broad interpretation of ERISA’s
“plain language,” the Court held that the Human Rights Law and New York
Benefits Law related to the ERISA plan and were consequently preempted. 51
Although this decision allowed employers to potentially avoid compliance with
the state law, the Court explicitly stated that states could require employers to
structure their pregnancy and disability benefits within a separate, non-ERISA
structure to avoid preemption. 52
After Shaw, most state laws that referenced or impacted ERISA, even
tangentially, were preempted because of this connection. 53 Twelve years later,
however, the Supreme Court backtracked and restricted ERISA’s broad
preemptive power. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Insurance Co., 54 the Court altered its ERISA preemption doctrine,
rejecting “uncritical literalism” for a narrower interpretation of the statute. 55 In
Travelers, a New York law required hospitals to collect surcharges from
commercial insurers, but not from patients insured under a Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plan. 56 The Court held that ERISA did not preempt the state law,
reasoning that a state law that exerts an “indirect economic influence” on a plan
does not necessarily trigger preemption under ERISA. 57 The New York law
created cost differences between the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and other
plans, but it did not impact the choices that plans made when administering

48. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id. at 96–97.
51. Id. at 97.
52. Id. at 108 (“If the State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan comports with the requirements
of its disability insurance law, it may compel the employer to maintain a separate plan that does
comply.”). After Shaw, state laws such as tort laws that applied to group benefit policies and antisubrogation statutes that applied to self-funded medical plans were found to be preempted because
they referenced or had a connection with ERISA. Edward A. Zelinsky, ERISA Preemption After
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: Completing the Retrenchment of Shaw, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301,
30 4 (2017).
53. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66 (1990) (holding that a Pennsylvania law
precluding ERISA plans from exercising subrogation rights on a plan beneficiary’s tort recovery was
preempted under section 514); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1990)
(holding that section 514 clearly preempted a state common law claim that an employee was unlawfully
discharged due to his employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the ERISA
plan).
54. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id. at 649.
57. Id.
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benefits. 58 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that rate differences between
plans are common without state action and concluded that “it is unlikely that
ERISA meant to bar such indirect economic influences under state law.” 59 The
Travelers decision restricted section 514(a)’s preemptive power over state law,
tying preemption to statutes that relate to the core functions of the ERISA plan.
Although the Court did not find preemption in Travelers, it cautioned that
not all state laws that indirectly impact ERISA plans will escape preemption.
“[I]t is possible that state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers . . . .” 60 Thus, if the state
law impacts the benefits provided or participants covered, then it is likely
preempted. Travelers refined ERISA preemption doctrine by focusing on the
state law’s impact on benefits provided by the plan and its administration,
specifically concentrating on the core objective of ERISA—ensuring uniform
administration of benefit plans—rather than any external factor that may
impact the plan.
In Travelers, the Court altered the ERISA preemption doctrine without
overruling its previous decisions. While narrowing the preemptive scope of
section 514(a), the Travelers decision also created more uncertainty in the law
because it upheld the previous Shaw line of cases while “simultaneous[ly]
repudiat[ing] . . . the expansive reading of [section] 514(a) upon which that line
is based.” 61
Following the Travelers decision, the Court struggled to reconcile its
decision with the broader interpretation of section 514(a) preemption in Shaw.
In holding that a California minimum wage law was not preempted by an
ERISA-covered apprenticeship fund, the Court reaffirmed its narrower reading
of ERISA preemption. 62 Despite concurring in the result, Justice Scalia argued
that the Court should address and overrule inconsistent prior interpretations of
the statute to clarify the post-Travelers state of the law. 63 Although the Court
58. Id. at 646.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 647.
61. Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA
Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 834 (1999).
62. See Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997)
(“The effect of the prevailing wage statute on ERISA-covered apprenticeship programs in California
is substantially similar to the effect of New York law on ERISA plans choosing whether to provide
health insurance benefits in New York through the Blues, or through a commercial carrier. The
prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans.”).
63. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion today because it is a fair
description of our prior case law, and a fair application of the more recent of that case law. Today’s
opinion is no more likely than our earlier ones, however, to bring clarity to this field—precisely because
it does obeisance to all our prior cases, instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in some of
them have in effect been abandoned.”).
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has not explicitly overruled its early ERISA preemption opinions, its most
recent decision in this area confirms a commitment to a broader interpretation
of section 514(a) ERISA preemption.
Most recently, the Court held that ERISA expressly preempts state
statutes directly affecting benefits administration. In Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 64 the Court held that a Vermont statute requiring health
insurance benefit plans to disclose claims data to a state database was preempted
by ERISA. 65 Liberty Mutual, the ERISA plan administrator, was concerned
that reporting claims data to the state would violate its fiduciary duty and
instructed its third-party administrator 66 not to comply with the Vermont law. 67
The Court found that “reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping are central to,
and an essential part of, the uniform system of plan administration
contemplated by ERISA.” 68 Moreover, state laws that govern this central
function of ERISA plans could create “wasteful administrative costs and
threaten to subject plans to wide-ranging liability.” 69 Because a primary goal of
ERISA is uniform plan administration, the Gobeille Court held that ERISA
preempts state laws that prevent uniform plan administration by requiring
national plans to report claims data to a specific state database. 70
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized that states may
request the Department of Labor (“DOL”) to provide information on ERISA
plans to the state, which would achieve the preempted Vermont’s statute’s
primary goal. 71 DOL has the authority to regulate plan reporting and
administration on a federal level and to clarify how state reporting requirements
affect ERISA plans. 72 Unlike some state laws, DOL regulation of ERISA plans
does not carry preemption risk.
64. 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016).
65. Id. at 947.
66. ERISA imposes liability on any fiduciary under the plan. Cassandra G. Sasso, Liability
of Fiduciaries Under ERISA, 21 COLO. LAW. 197, 197 (1992). A person or entity is a plan fiduciary
if they exercise authority or control regarding the administration or maintenance of the plan’s
assets. Id. A third-party administrator, which is “a company that provides operational services such as
claims processing and employee benefits management under contract to another company,” may be
liable as a fiduciary under ERISA depending on the extent of its involvement in the plan
administration. Julia Kagan, Third Party Administrator (TPA), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 30,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/third-party-claims-administrator.asp [https://perma.cc/
H7DE-27Y5].
67. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 942.
68. Id. at 945.
69. Id.
70. See id. The Court held that (1) recordkeeping and reporting were central to plan
administration, and (2) allowing different states to impose different requirements on federally
regulated ERISA plans would hinder the goal of uniform plan administration. Id. at 947.
71. Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. See id.; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 505,
88 Stat. 829, 894 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1135).
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State Law Claims for Tortious Invasion of Privacy Have Not Been Preempted
by ERISA

Courts have held that state tortious invasion of privacy claims against
ERISA plans are not preempted because the state laws apply generally and do
not directly impact the administration of benefits. For example, in Darcangelo
v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 73 an employee sued her employer and the
administrator of her disability benefits plan alleging violations of Maryland’s
medical confidentiality statute and unfair and deceptive trade practices statute,
as well as claims of invasion of privacy, negligence, and breach of contract. 74
The plaintiff alleged that the administrator, acting as an agent of Verizon (her
employer), unlawfully obtained access to her medical records in an effort to
provide Verizon with a justification for firing her. 75 Reversing the district court
on all but the breach of contract claim, 76 the Fourth Circuit held that ERISA
did not preempt the other state law claims because the complaint “charge[d the
administrator] with conduct that [was] entirely unrelated to its duties under the
ERISA plan.” 77 The defendants’ conduct was so far outside of ERISA’s core
function of plan administration that it was not acting as a fiduciary at the time
of the alleged misconduct. 78 Consequently, the claims were not related to a core
function of ERISA because the defendants were not acting in furtherance of
ERISA’s central goals. 79
Although Darcangelo does not specifically address invasion of privacy
claims and ERISA, it generally holds that wrongful actions by employers and
plan administrators that go beyond ordinary operations of the plan do not
escape state law just because they are associated with ERISA. It is notable that,
rather than failing to protect an employee’s privacy, the defendants in
Darcangelo allegedly acted affirmatively to invade the employee’s privacy. 80
Similarly, in Dishman v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, 81 the Ninth
Circuit held that tortious conduct only loosely related to plan administration is
not preempted by ERISA. 82 There, the plaintiff sued the insurance company
73. 292 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 186.
75. Id.
76. The court held that the breach of contract claim was “completely preempted and [was]
transformed into a federal claim under ERISA [section] 502.” Id. at 187.
77. Id. at 186.
78. Id. at 192–93.
79. See id.
80. In contrast, data breach claims often allege that a defendant failed to take prudent precautions
to secure data and protect a plan participant’s privacy. A court may be more likely to conclude that a
plan administrator who fails to secure participants’ data is acting within the confines of ERISA plan
administration, and consequently, a negligence claim brought by a plan fiduciary after a data breach
would be preempted. See Moran, supra note 3, at 504.
81. 269 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2001).
82. Id. at 979–80.
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that administered his employer’s long-term disability benefits plan in an effort
to challenge the suspension of his disability benefits and demonstrate that the
insurer was vicariously liable for tortious invasion of privacy by its
investigators. 83 UNUM initially granted Dishman’s claim for disability benefits
but later investigated the claim. 84 Dishman alleged that an investigator retained
by UNUM wrongfully elicited personal information about him by: (1) claiming
to be a bank loan officer to verify information about him, (2) falsely
representing that he had volunteered to coach a basketball team, (3)
impersonating him to get credit card information and travel itineraries, and (4)
repeatedly calling and photographing his residence. 85 The Ninth Circuit held
that, although “there [was] clearly some relationship between the conduct
alleged and the administration of the plan, it is not enough of a relationship to
warrant preemption.” 86 Because the defendant’s conduct was more of a “gardenvariety” tort rather than an act of plan administration, Dishman’s state common
law tort action was not preempted under section 514(a). 87
C.

State Data Breach Laws Likely Escape ERISA Preemption

The Supreme Court has not yet addressed ERISA preemption of state
data privacy and data breach laws. 88 However, two district court cases recently
considered whether ERISA preempts state data privacy laws. These cases
illustrate two central questions that arise when looking at the interaction
between state data privacy laws and ERISA. First, is data privacy, or the
reasonable attempt to keep consumer personal information private, a benefit as
defined by ERISA? And second, do state data privacy laws affect the uniform
administration of ERISA plans?
In a Ninth Circuit class action data breach case, In re Anthem, Inc. Data
Breach Litigation, 89 a California district court held that the defendants’ claims
were neither completely nor expressly preempted by ERISA. 90 The court
declined to extend the definition of plan benefit under ERISA to include data
security because ERISA defines benefits as insurance-type payments or
coverage for healthcare-related services, and thus found no section 502 complete

83. Id. at 979.
84. Id. at 978.
85. Id. at 979–80.
86. Id. at 984.
87. Id.
88. Although not related to data privacy, the Ninth Circuit did rule that a state law claim for
tortious invasion of privacy was not preempted by ERISA. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
269 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that pursuing a tortious invasion of privacy action against
plan administrators would not interfere with the uniform administration of benefits because it would
not require administrators to “vary their administration of benefits state by state”).
89. No. 15-MD-02617, 2016 WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016).
90. Id. at *48, *50.
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preemption. 91 When analyzing express preemption, the court determined that
“laws that implicate the administration of ERISA benefits are subject to express
preemption, and laws that do not are not preempted.” 92 It reasoned that the
state laws applicable to the plaintiffs’ argument qualified as “laws of general
application, and do not focus exclusively (or, for that matter, even primarily)
upon ERISA plan administration.” 93 Because the plaintiffs’ state law claims 94
did not “implicate the administration of ERISA benefits,” they were not
preempted by ERISA. 95
In In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 96 an
Oregon district court also held ERISA does not preempt state data security
laws. 97 There, the defendant, an ERISA plan administrator, argued that the
plaintiffs’ claims were completely preempted because they could have been
brought under ERISA’s section 502 civil enforcement scheme. 98 The Oregon
court held that “the fact that data security protection is not a ‘benefit’ under
ERISA is not determinative of whether complete preemption applies” 99
because plaintiffs may sue under section 502 to “‘enforce [their] rights’ under
the plan.” 100 The plaintiffs alleged that the express terms of their plan required
Premera to provide “reasonable and adequate data security measures,” 101 and,
because the plan discussed data security, the court held that “at least some of
the claims . . . could have been brought under [section] 502(a).” 102 Ultimately,
the Premera court found that “although there is some relationship between data
security and the administration of Plaintiffs’ ERISA plans, it is not enough to
overcome the presumption against preemption of state law.” 103
These district court cases suggest that ERISA does not preempt state data
breach laws. The state data breach laws generally apply to all companies, not
91. Id. at *48. State law claims to recover ERISA plan benefits, including healthcare costs and
retirement plan disbursements, are completely preempted by ERISA section 502. See supra notes 29–
36 and accompanying text.
92. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *50.
93. Id. at *49.
94. The district court reviewed plaintiffs’ claims against Anthem under a number of state law
claims, including one under the Georgia Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act, ch. 39,
1982 Ga. Laws 615 (1982) (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-39-1 to -23 (LEXIS through
the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)). In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *4.
95. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *50. The court also noted that invasion of privacy claims
are not subject to ERISA preemption. Id. (citing Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d
974, 984 (9th Cir. 2001)).
96. No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL 539578, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017).
97. Id. at *22.
98. Id. at *18.
99. Id. at *20.
100. Id. at *19 (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004)).
101. Id. at *20.
102. Id. The district court determined that, because the plaintiffs were suing to enforce terms under
the plan, they could have brought at least some of their claims under section 502. Id.
103. Id. at *22.
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just the ERISA plan administrators. Although liability for data breach would
indirectly impact the plan’s administration of benefits through increased costs
and risk mitigation efforts, it would not likely impact whether and how plan
participants receive their benefits.
D.

ERISA Plan Fiduciaries May Have a Duty To Reasonably Protect Participant
Data

ERISA states that plan sponsors and plan administrators have a fiduciary
duty to plan participants and may be personally liable for any losses a plan
incurs from a data breach. 104 ERISA requires fiduciaries to discharge their
duties “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances”
that a “prudent man . . . familiar with such matters” would use. 105 Apart from
reports from the ERISA Advisory Council, 106 DOL has failed to issue
conclusive regulatory guidance on plan administrators’ fiduciary duty as it
relates to data privacy. 107
However, recent litigation in response to 401(k) cybersecurity breaches
and distribution fraud suggests that plan sponsors and administrators may have
a fiduciary duty when it comes to data privacy and security. 108 A participant in
Estee Lauder’s 401(k) plan sued the plan sponsor and providers alleging breach
of fiduciary duty by failing to safeguard the plan assets against unauthorized
distributions and failing to maintain adequate cybersecurity defenses. 109 The
complaint alleged that in September or October of 2016, an unknown person or
persons stole $99,000 in three different unauthorized distributions from the
plaintiff’s retirement account. 110 The parties later settled the case. 111
In a similar case, Bartnett v. Abbott Laboratories, 112 the plaintiff sued her
employer (the plan sponsor) and the retirement plan administrator for breach
of fiduciary duty and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

104. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 409(a), 88 Stat.
829, 886 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)); see also supra note 37. Plan fiduciaries include anyone who
provides investment advice for the plan or exercises discretionary control over the plan’s operation.
Usually these fiduciaries include plan trustees, administrators, and members of the plan’s investment
committee. Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/
fiduciaryresp [https://perma.cc/V8FM-99XZ].
105. § 404(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)).
106. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
107. Moran, supra note 3, at 486.
108. Mamorsky, supra note 2.
109. Rebecca Moore, Parties in Suit About Estee Lauder 401(k) Account Data Breach Announce
Settlement, PLANSPONSOR (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.plansponsor.com/parties-suit-estee-lauder401k-account-data-breach-announce-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/AEF9-MD5Z].
110. Complaint (ERISA) at 4–5, Berman v. Estee Lauder Inc., No. 19-cv-06489 (N.D. Cal. filed
Oct. 9, 2019).
111. Moore, supra note 109.
112. No. 20-CV-02127, 2020 WL 5878015 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2020).
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Practices Act 113 after an unknown third party accessed her account, changed the
password, and stole $245,000 from the account. 114 The court held that the
plaintiff stated a claim against the plan administrator for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA and that the state law claims for deceptive trade practices
were not preempted. 115 Similarly, a Third Circuit district court held that plan
administrators have a fiduciary duty to guard against fraudulent withdrawal
requests from ERISA-covered retirement accounts caused by a cybersecurity
breach. 116
Given the modern state of data security and clear frequency and danger of
breach, 117 it is almost certain that ERISA fiduciaries have a duty to take some
data security measures. However, plans have little guidance on what is required
by federal law. 118 As data security becomes a more pressing issue, plan
administrators should evaluate whether their fiduciary duty to prudently invest,
administer, and protect plan assets includes a duty to protect against data
breach. ERISA plans often contract with a third-party administrator to
administer benefits, and this fiduciary duty to guard participant data may
extend to the prudent selection of service providers. 119
If ERISA’s fiduciary duty does extend to data security and a plan
participant’s data is breached, the plan fiduciary still may not have necessarily
breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA. 120 If the fiduciary can prove that they
took appropriate measures to guard against the breach, then they will likely not
be found liable. 121 However, there is no official guidance regarding what types
of cybersecurity controls are appropriate and necessary in the retirement plan
113. Ch. 121 1/2, 1961 Ill. Laws 1867 (1961) (codified as amended at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 505/1 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-651)).
114. Bartnett, 2020 WL 5878015, at *2.
115. Id. at *8–9.
116. See Leventhal v. MandMarblestone Grp., LLC, No. 18-cv-2727, 2019 WL 1953247, at *7
(E.D. Pa. May 1, 2019). The court also held that the plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of contract
were preempted by ERISA because they related to the plan’s administration. Id.
117. Moran, supra note 3, at 490–91 (“[A]t least on some level, data breaches are unavoidable. Data
thieves have the time, money, and tools to attack businesses relentlessly—in fact, hackers released
around 357 million new variations of malicious programs in 2016 alone. . . . Under these circumstances,
it is no wonder that so many high profile targets have suffered data breaches, including federal agencies
such as the State Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and even the National Security Agency.”
(footnotes omitted)).
118. Id. at 486–87.
119. See Caroline E. Nelson, Participant Data and Fiduciary Liability: The Current Regulatory
Environment, the Vanderbilt Lawsuit, and Best Practices for Benefit Plan Sponsors, MCGRATH N.: BLOG
(Aug. 30, 2020), http://www.mcgrathnorth.com/employee-benefits-point-of-law/participant-dataand-fiduciary-liability-the-current-regulatory-environment-the-vanderbilt-lawsuit-and-best-practicesfor-benefit-plan-sponsors/ [https://perma.cc/33Y9-2X5H].
120. Maria P. Rasmussen, ERISA and Cybersecurity, MCGUIREWOODS (June 5, 2016),
https://www.passwordprotectedlaw.com/2016/06/erisa-and-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/F7PAWERR].
121. Id.
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context. 122 In a recent settlement between Vanderbilt University ERISA plans
and their participants, 123 the plaintiffs alleged that the university breached its
fiduciary duty by allowing a third party to obtain participants’ private
information and to profit from that access. 124 Because the case settled, the
matter of whether PII qualifies as a plan asset and thus implicates the plan’s
fiduciary duty remains unresolved.
To date, DOL has not issued direct guidance on security and privacy
requirements for participant data. 125 However, with the frequency of data
breaches and likely post-CCPA increase in litigation concerning these
matters, 126 DOL or the courts should provide further guidance on this issue.
II. THE CCPA AND ERISA
Over half of all states considered consumer data privacy bills in 2019, 127
and most states have legislation that addresses the security of private consumer
information such as social security numbers, credit information, or other
identifying information. 128 In 2018, California passed the CCPA, which is the
most expansive privacy legislation in the United States to date. 129 The CCPA
requires businesses to disclose how they use consumer data and clearly provide
consumers with the option to opt out of the sale of their personal data. 130 The

122. Michael Abbott & Aaron K. Tantleff, ERISA/Cybersecurity Considerations in the COVID Age,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/
2020/10/erisa-cybersecurity-considerations-covid-age [https://perma.cc/22HF-PG5M]. Plans may
choose to apply the requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), for cybersecurity they already use for personal health information to PII
contained in retirement plan documents. Although this is not required, it would likely provide
sufficient evidence that the plan took appropriate data security measures. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, supra note 11, at 9.
123. Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
124. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged other breaches of fiduciary duty related to the plan’s investment
decisions and contracting with third parties. Id.
125. Moran, supra note 3, at 486.
126. David A. Zetoony & Jena M. Valdetero, 2019 Data Breach Litigation Report, BRYAN CAVE
LEIGHTON PAISNER (May 15, 2019), https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/thought-leadership/2019-databreach-litigation-report.html [https://perma.cc/6RAM-5CUE].
127. Rich Ehisen, Battles Still Rage over Calif. Data, Worker Classification Laws, LAW360
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1198833/battles-still-rage-over-calif-data-workerclassification-laws [https://perma.cc/AKG7-GNDD (dark archive)].
128. Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NCSL (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/
W2R7-JWSV].
129. Max N. Helveston, Reining in Commercial Exploitation of Consumer Data, 123 PENN ST. L.
REV. 667, 689 (2019).
130. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1809, 1811–12
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.120(a) (2020)); see also Stuart D. Levi,
California Privacy Law: What Companies Should Do To Prepare in 2019, SKADDEN (Jan. 17, 2019),
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Act also makes it easier for individuals to sue businesses for data breach,
providing consumers with a private right of action. 131 Because general federal
privacy regulation does not rise to the level of the CCPA, 132 the Act will likely
become a de facto national privacy law due to California’s impact on interstate
commerce. 133
The CCPA applies to companies that do business in California and have
more than $25 million in gross revenue, store data on over 50,000 consumers, 134
or make more than half of their revenue from selling consumer data. 135 The Act
defines a consumer as “a natural person who is a California resident” 136 and
personal information as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is
reasonably capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked,
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” 137 However,
the Act excludes information covered by a number of federal statutes, 138
including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), 139 the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 140 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 141 or the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. 142 A recent amendment to the law
also excludes employment information from the Act’s scope until January 1,

https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/california-privacy-law [https://
perma.cc/5WYG-44AW].
131. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1)
(2020)).
132. However, some specific federal statutes, such as HIPAA or the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
contain data security provisions. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019) (HIPAA Privacy Rule); id.
§§ 164.400–.414 (HIPAA Breach Notification Rule); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (Fair Credit Reporting Act
Furnisher Rule).
133. Levi, supra note 130 (“The law effectively sets the floor for nationwide privacy protection,
since organizations may not want to maintain two privacy frameworks — one for California residents
and one for all other citizens.”).
134. See supra note 22 (explaining that this threshold will increase from 50,000 to 100,000
consumers on January 1, 2023).
135. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1815 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (2020));
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa
[https://perma.cc/6N7E-YZ84].
136. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1816 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (2020)).
137. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1817 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)
(2020)).
138. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820–21 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c)–
(f) (2020)).
139. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
140. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681).
141. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
142. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721).
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2023. 143 However, after this yearlong grace period, the CCPA will apply to all
employee information. 144
The CCPA outlines four basic consumer rights related to personal data:
(1) the right to know what personal information a business has collected
about them and how it is being used; (2) the right to “opt out” of a
business selling their personal information; (3) the right to have a
business delete their personal information; and (4) the right to receive
equal service and pricing from a business, even if they exercise their
privacy rights under the Act. 145
The CCPA imposes comprehensive reporting requirements for businesses, and
this generally includes ERISA plans unless ERISA is found to preempt the law.
However, the CCPA does exempt from its scope private health information
that is covered by HIPAA. 146 Therefore, most employer-sponsored health plan
information is not subject to the CCPA. 147 Unlike the exemption for selffunded healthcare plans, the CCPA does not exclude retirement plans covered
by ERISA. These plans may be subject to the CCPA’s extensive reporting
requirements, which could affect how companies and plans administer
retirement benefits.
The CCPA’s civil enforcement mechanism operates similarly to state data
breach laws. 148 Although the California Attorney General is charged with
enforcing the CCPA, the Act’s civil enforcement mechanism allows consumers
to bring suit against businesses in the event of a data breach. 149 If the business
violates its “duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices appropriate to the nature of the information,” the affected consumer
143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
144. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 15 (Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.145(m)(4), (n)(3) (2020)). The CCPA also excludes “publicly available information,”
which means “information that is lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government
records.” California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1817 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(o)(2) (2020)). Despite this definition in the Act, the precise
contours of what information is publicly available remains unclear. See Stuart L. Pardau, The California
Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style Privacy Regime in the United States, 23 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 68, 93 (2018).
145. Pardau, supra note 144, at 72; see also § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1809–12 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.120, 1798.125 (2020)).
146. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c)(1) (2020)).
147. Sotto et al., supra note 25.
148. For a general discussion of whether state data breach laws may be preempted, see supra notes
89–103 and accompanying text.
149. For example, the California Attorney General may pursue legal action against businesses that
violate the Act’s reporting requirements, but consumers may not. Consumers may only pursue claims
against entities if their data security has been compromised and only after providing the business thirtydays’ written notice unless the action is solely for pecuniary damages resulting from the alleged
violation. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821–22 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)–(b)
(2020)).
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may bring suit to recover damages “not less than one hundred dollars ($100)
and not greater than seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750)” per consumer,
“[i]njunctive or declaratory relief,” or “[a]ny other relief the court deems
proper.” 150 The CCPA is currently the only comprehensive state data privacy
law that includes a private right of action for consumers. 151 However, this
private right of action is limited to instances of data breach, 152 with the
California Attorney General having enforcement authority over all other
violations. 153
The CCPA could impact ERISA plans in two ways. First, the Act’s
reporting and notification requirements could require ERISA plan providers to
overhaul data security and compliance procedures, increasing administration
costs. Second, plan sponsors and fiduciaries would face increased risk of
litigation due to the civil enforcement mechanism. Companies providing
ERISA-covered retirement plans could face increased legal compliance costs as
well as costs associated with litigation. However, because the California
Attorney General has discretionary enforcement of the Act, 154 it is also possible
that noncompliant plans will not be penalized.
III. ERISA MAY PREEMPT THE CCPA BECAUSE OF THE STATE LAW’S
BROAD SCOPE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PLAN ADMINISTRATION
This part will examine the likelihood of complete preemption under
ERISA section 502 and express preemption under section 514(a). Because
ERISA does not specifically reference data security within its civil enforcement
scheme (section 502), a court is more likely to find that the CCPA is expressly
preempted because of its possible interference with the uniform plan
administration.

150. Id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1)
(2020)).
151. See Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.cc/8HYQ-LXXQ] (last
updated Feb. 14, 2021).
152. See § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1821. The private right of action would likely result in increased
litigation against plans in the event of data breach.
153. See id. § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1822 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155
(2020)).
154. See John Stephens, California Consumer Privacy Act, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 24, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201
902/fa_9/ [https://perma.cc/E75B-MBDA]. On January 1, 2023, the California Attorney General will
no longer enforce the Act; rather, the Act will be enforced in administrative proceedings brought by
the California Privacy Protection Agency. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 § 17
(Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 (2020)).
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ERISA Likely Does Not Completely Preempt the CCPA and Other State Data
Privacy Laws Because Data Privacy Is Not a Plan Benefit

Under section 502(a) of ERISA, a “participant or beneficiary” may bring
a civil action to recover plan benefits or enforce their rights under the plan. 155
If a plaintiff brings an action to “recover benefits due,” “enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan,” or to “clarify his rights to future benefits,” the plaintiff
must bring the action under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision in federal
court. 156 State law claims that could be brought under section 502 when no
independent legal duty exists are consequently preempted, and the state court
must remove the action to federal court. 157 For example, a plaintiff’s breach of
contract action to recover pension benefits owed to them would be preempted
because section 502 of ERISA provides an enforcement scheme, and no
independent legal duty is implicated outside of providing the benefits.
When plaintiffs bring claims to recover actual monetary benefits owed
under a plan, it is fairly evident that section 502 will supplant the state law. 158
However, the preemption and removal decision becomes less clear when a
plaintiff sues to “enforce his rights under . . . the plan.” Taken at its broadest,
this phrase could extend beyond rights to benefits promised by the plan and
thus be interpreted to include a beneficiary’s right to privacy of their personal
information. 159 Preemption in this case hinges on whether the statute covers
only a beneficiary’s right to retain benefits or if it defines rights more broadly
to include the right to security of one’s personal data. Although circuit courts
have not yet determined whether data security qualifies as a benefit under
ERISA, several district courts have addressed the issue. In In re Anthem, Inc.
Data Breach Litigation, 160 the court determined that data security was not a
benefit under the plan, so plaintiffs’ claims were not completely preempted. 161
The In re: Premera court also held that data security was not an ERISA plan
benefit, but it found that the plaintiffs’ rights under the plan had been breached
because the plan expressly stated the plan’s duty to protect participants’

155. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a), 88 Stat.
829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)).
156. Id. § 502(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)).
157. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s
claim must be brought exclusively as a federal cause of action because the claim fell under the civil
enforcement provision of ERISA).
158. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–57 (1987) (holding that ERISA’s civil
enforcement scheme preempted the plaintiff’s state cause of action for improper benefits claims
processing).
159. See In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL
539578, at *20 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017).
160. No. 15-MD-026170, 2016 WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016).
161. Id. at *47–48.
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privacy. 162 However, the court ultimately held that the state law imposed an
independent legal duty apart from the ERISA plan such that complete
preemption did not apply. 163
It is likely that a court would not find the CCPA’s private right of action
completely preempted by ERISA. ERISA’s limited definition of benefits does
not explicitly include data security and instead focuses on members’ rights in
relation to the administration of those benefits. Thus, unless specifically
included in plan documents, plan participants likely do not have a right to data
security under the plan. 164 When Congress passed ERISA, it did not address
consumers’ rights related to privacy and data security. 165 Congress intended to
pass a scheme of comprehensive legislation to protect the benefit expectations
of workers while promoting the growth of these pension plans, 166 but Congress
almost certainly did not intend for ERISA to regulate data privacy as well.
Although ERISA does not address data security and privacy, it does
impose a fiduciary duty on plans and their administrators. 167 ERISA requires
plan fiduciaries to act “with care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use.” 168 The issue here is whether allowing a
data breach to occur or inadvertently disclosing members’ personal information
would constitute breach of fiduciary duty such that plaintiffs could seek
damages under section 502.
If a court determines that protecting against data breach falls within the
ERISA fiduciary duty, then state data breach claims would be completely
preempted. If plaintiffs successfully allege breach of fiduciary duty, they must
also successfully argue that there was an injury-in-fact. 169 With the current
162. In re: Premera, 2017 WL 539578, at *20–22 (finding that, because the plan documents included
data privacy provisions, at least some of the plaintiffs’ claims could have been brought under
section 502(a) “to enforce their alleged rights under their ERISA plan”).
163. Id. at *22 (“Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an independent legal duty separate from the
ERISA plan that has been implicated by Premera’s alleged actions. Thus, complete preemption under
ERISA does not apply.”).
164. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
165. Moran, supra note 3, at 498.
166. Cohen, supra note 5, at 589.
167. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404, 88 Stat.
829, 877–78 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104); see also supra note 104.
168. § 404(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 877 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)).
169. John Utz, Privacy Risks for Non-Health Benefit Plans, LAW360 (July 2, 2018, 1:09
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1055852/privacy-risks-for-non-health-employee-benefit-plans
[https://perma.cc/4643-X99P (dark archive)] (“To sue in federal court the participant must have an
injury-in-fact within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, and must also have suffered
an injury to have recourse under ERISA.”). The Supreme Court has held that to establish standing
in federal court a plaintiff must prove that they experienced a “concrete and particularized”
injury. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). A “bare procedural [statutory] violation” without the risk of real harm
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frequency of data breach, plaintiffs could have a difficult time proving that the
fiduciary’s irresponsible management or failure to act was the proximate cause
of the injury and that the breach of personal information could not have just as
likely been caused by a non-ERISA entity. 170
It is possible that a court would find complete preemption of a claim for
damages caused by data breach, but not likely. Courts have generally
interpreted the ERISA fiduciary duty narrowly, focusing on prudent
investment of pension plans and administration of benefits. 171 A court would
more likely determine preemption based on ERISA’s section 514 express
preemption provision because the CCPA imposes an independent legal duty on
plans to guard against data breach and respond to privacy threats. 172
B.

Whether ERISA Section 514(a) Expressly Preempts the CCPA Depends on
How Broadly a Court Interprets “Relates to”

ERISA section 514(a) preempts state laws that relate to any ERISA
plan. 173 A law relates to an ERISA plan (1) if it explicitly references the plan 174
or (2) if the state law has an “impermissible ‘connection with’” the plan such
that it “‘governs . . . a central matter of plan administration’ or ‘interferes with

does not satisfy the concreteness requirement. Id. at 1550. Courts look to history and
congressional intent to determine whether an injury—tangible or intangible—occurred, and
the individual plaintiff must have personally suffered the injury. Id. at 1548–49. Plaintiffs meet the
standing requirement when they actually experience identity theft resulting from a data breach;
however, circuits differ on whether an alleged risk of future harm from data breach is substantial enough
to meet the Article III standing requirement. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir.
2017); see also Nancy R. Thomas, No Injury, No Data Breach Claims? Depends on the Circuit,
MORRISONFOERSTER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200917-no-databreach-claims.html [https://perma.cc/9ZJX-BBWX] (discussing how the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits have found that the alleged risk of future harm meets Article III standing and the Third,
Fourth, and Eighth have found that it does not).
170. Utz, supra note 169. Because data breaches are common and affect so many people, it is hard
for plaintiffs to prove that the loss of their personal information was caused by a breach at a specific
company. See Nicole Hong, For Consumers, Injury Is Hard To Prove in Data-Breach Cases, WALL ST. J.
(June 26, 2016, 8:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-consumers-injury-is-hard-to-prove-indata-breach-cases-1466985988 [https://perma.cc/A4CN-UAGA] (“Companies say having personal
data compromised doesn’t necessarily equate to an injury that merits compensation. Even when real
harm occurs, such as when stolen credit-card information is used for fraudulent purchases, customers
often struggle to prove that the fraud stemmed from a breach at one particular company. What’s more,
banks typically reimburse their customers for fraudulent charges.”).
171. See, e.g., In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017
WL 539578, at *21–22 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017).
172. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1821–22
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (2020)).
173. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 88 Stat. at 897 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
174. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1992) (“ERISA
pre-empts any state law that refers to . . . covered benefit plans . . . .”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021)

2021]

PREEMPTION PROBLEM

813

nationally uniform plan administration.’” 175 For example, the Supreme Court
held that a Vermont law requiring ERISA health benefit plans to report claims
data to a state database was preempted because the law’s requirements were
impermissibly connected to ERISA such that compliance would burden plan
administration. 176
The CCPA exempts some entities covered by federal law from
compliance, 177 but it does not exempt ERISA-covered nonhealthcare plans, such
as employee benefit plans. Because the CCPA does not explicitly reference
ERISA, preemption hinges on whether there is an impermissible connection
between the state law and ERISA that governs a central matter of plan
administration or interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.
Courts must consider whether data security and privacy constitute a
“central matter of plan administration.” 178 Although data security measures
have become ubiquitous if not mandatory, ERISA’s central matters concern the
regulation of welfare benefits and retirement income for plan participants. 179
Moreover, ERISA does not reference data security or privacy within its text. 180
Proponents of preemption may argue that the nature of personal information
collected by plans and the extensive reporting requirements within ERISA
indicate that data privacy has become a central matter of plan administration. 181
Additionally, a court could find that the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements imposed by the CCPA are a central part of plan administration
and thus expressly preempted by ERISA. 182 Overall, preemption hinges on
whether the CCPA imposes “direct regulation of a fundamental ERISA
function” that would impact the uniform administration of the plan. 183 ERISA
plans will likely argue that collecting and maintaining participant data is an
essential part of plan administration because it directly impacts the plan’s ability
to provide benefits to its participants. When a pension plan must follow a
different set of regulations for its California participants, there is an argument
175. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
176. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
177. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. at 1820–21 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145 (2020)).
178. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148
(2001)).
179. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 589.
180. See Moran, supra note 3, at 498.
181. In fact, some ERISA-covered retirement plans share consumer data to promote other
financial products. See John Manganaro, Vanderbilt Settlement Agreement Prohibits Data-Based Cross
Selling, PLANADVISER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/vanderbilt-settlementagreement-prohibits-data-based-cross-selling/ [https://perma.cc/5FGD-DJMD].
182. Most recently, the Supreme Court held that a Vermont state law requiring healthcare plans
to submit claims records to a state database “enter[ed] a fundamental area of ERISA regulation” and
was thus preempted. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946.
183. Id.
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that the regulations directly impact the uniform administration of benefits and
thus the CCPA relates to ERISA.
If ERISA does preempt the CCPA, the lack of regulation of ERISAmember PII will likely persist unless ERISA is amended to include specific data
privacy regulations or Congress enacts a national privacy law. Without further
guidance from DOL or the courts, plans may choose to comply with the CCPA
rather than risk the consequences of noncompliance.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION
When evaluating the ERISA preemption question, the Supreme Court
has instructed that courts begin with a presumption against preemption because
ERISA was not intended to replace all state laws. 184 Following the Court’s
analysis in Gobeille, preemption hinges on two questions. First, does the state
law act immediately or exclusively upon the ERISA plan? 185 Second, does the
act govern a central matter of plan administration or interfere with a nationally
uniform system of administration? 186 At the same time, the Court has held that
ERISA does not preempt state laws of general applicability. 187 Thus, if a court
finds that ERISA does not preempt the CCPA, it will likely focus on the
general applicability of the CCPA and on ERISA’s silence regarding data
security. 188
This part discusses reasons why the CCPA may escape preemption and
determines that partial preemption of the CCPA’s reporting and disclosure
requirements is the most likely outcome.
A.

Obligations Imposed by the CCPA May Extend Beyond ERISA’s Fiduciary
Duty

Plaintiffs seeking to avoid preemption must first overcome the section 502
complete preemption hurdle before arguing against express preemption under
section 514(a). 189 Under section 502, a plan participant may bring suit to recover
benefits promised under the plan. 190 The district court in In re Anthem concluded
that section 502 civil enforcement rights only pertain to a plaintiff’s rights to

184. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997).
185. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814–15; Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997).
188. See In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:15-MD-2633, 2017
WL 539578, at *20–22 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617,
2016 WL 3029783, at *49 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016).
189. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.
190. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88
Stat. 829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
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retain benefits under the plan. 191 The court then discussed whether protecting
customer PII qualifies as an ERISA benefit. 192 Although ERISA does not
define “benefit,” subsections consistently refer to benefits as payments for
healthcare-related services or payments sent to beneficiaries. 193 As such, courts
have generally construed benefits narrowly. 194 Even a medical reimbursement
claim was not considered a benefit under section 502 complete preemption
when the claim related to the ERISA plan or when section 502 could provide a
similar remedy. 195 Ultimately, the court stressed “the importance of construing
ERISA benefits in a narrow manner,” and because ERISA is silent on privacy
obligations, the court declined to extend complete preemption. 196
In In re: Premera, the district court extended complete preemption despite
acknowledging that data privacy is not a benefit as defined by ERISA. 197
Because Congress did not include the term benefit in the second type of
section 502 claims (to enforce rights under the plan) but did include benefit in
the first and third claim types, 198 the court reasoned that Congress intended for
rights to extend beyond plan benefits. 199 Thus, the complete preemption
question partially hinged on whether the plan included “data security
promises.” 200 If the plan did include data security promises and the plan failed
to uphold those promises, then claims to enforce those rights under the plan
could have been brought under section 502. 201
Although the In re: Premera court found some of the plaintiffs’ claims
completely preempted, the plan’s independent legal duty to “reasonably and
adequately” protect participants’ data prevented complete preemption over all
claims. 202 Because the plan sponsor had a duty to protect participants’ PII under
191. In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *47. (“To put it another way, ERISA complete preemption
applies where ERISA benefits are at issue, and does not apply when ERISA benefits are not at issue.”).
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., id. at *47–48 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Marin Gen. Hosp. v.
Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009)).
195. See id.
196. Id. at *48.
197. In re: Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 15-md-2633, 2017 WL
539578, at *20 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017).
198. See id. at *18 (discussing a beneficiary’s ability “to enforce his or her rights under the plan”
without reference to a benefit in the second type of claim available under section 502).
199. See id. at *18–19 (“The Court’s interpretation that the second type of claim does not solely
involve rights to ‘benefits’ is also supported by the Supreme Court’s description of the types of claims
under section 502(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court noted that ‘[i]f a participant or beneficiary believes
that benefits promised to him under the terms of the plan are not provided, he can bring suit seeking
provision of those benefits. A participant or beneficiary can also bring suit generically to “enforce his
rights” under the plan, or to clarify any of his rights to future benefits.’” (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004))).
200. Id. at *20.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *20–22.
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state law, HIPAA, and industry standards, the plaintiffs’ claims were not solely
based on the plan’s fiduciary duty under ERISA. 203
B.

The CCPA’s General Applicability May Save It from Preemption

The strongest argument against express preemption of the CCPA is the
Act’s general applicability to businesses throughout California. It “function[s]
irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan” and consequently should not be
preempted. 204 Opponents of preemption may argue that the goals of the CCPA
fall within the traditional state police power to regulate businesses in the
interest of consumers and thus should not be preempted.
Generally applicable state laws may impact ERISA plans, but that does
not necessarily mean that ERISA preempts them. When evaluating whether
ERISA preempted a California state tax law, 205 the Second Circuit further
discussed the types of generally applicable laws that have not been preempted
including:
(1) a generally applicable garnishment law under which creditors may
garnish ERISA welfare benefits; (2) a law requiring companies to make
lump-sum severance payments when closing a plant; (3) a law
prescribing the amount that hospitals can charge for care; and (4) a city
income tax of general application that affects employee contributions to
benefit plans. 206
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit thus distinguished between state
laws that may impact ERISA plans and laws that control ERISA plan
decisions—with only the latter triggering preemption. 207
The Supreme Court addressed state regulation of healthcare in Travelers,
noting that reading all state laws that impact the costs of healthcare plans as
preempted would displace state law and contradict the intent of the statute. 208
The consumer privacy regulation within the CCPA, like healthcare regulation,
may impact the cost of retirement plans, but it also generally applies to all
203. Id. at *21.
204. Id. at *22 (arguing that the state law is not preempted because the existence of an ERISA plan
is not essential for the state law to operate).
205. Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that California’s
unrelated business taxable income exemption system was not preempted by ERISA because “taxation
is a realm of historic state control” and does not have an impermissible “connection with” an ERISA
plan even though the law “may have an indirect effect on [investment] choices”).
206. Id. at 430–31.
207. Id. at 431.
208. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
661 (1995) (“Indeed, to read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and
charges on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that purchase insurance policies or
HMO memberships that would cover such services would effectively read the limiting language in
§ 514(a) out of the statute, a conclusion that would violate basic principles of statutory
interpretation . . . .”).
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California residents and large businesses transacting in California. 209 Allowing
preemption in this case would invalidate a state law regulating an area in which
federal legislation remains silent. Moreover, allowing ERISA plans to sidestep
state data privacy laws could put participants’ benefits at risk, which is contrary
to the statute’s intent. 210
C.

A Likely Outcome: Partial Preemption

If faced with the ERISA preemption question regarding the CCPA, courts
may look to the functional aspects of the state law to determine whether a part
of the Act relates to an ERISA plan. A court will likely rule that aspects of the
CCPA directly affecting the ERISA plan’s reporting, disclosure, and benefitsadministration functions are preempted, but general CCPA provisions dealing
with consumer rights and privacy are not preempted. For example, the CCPA
grants consumers the right to request specific information that businesses
collect about them. 211 This consumer right is not afforded to ERISA plan
participants specifically, so it likely would not be preempted because it generally
applies to all consumers and does not relate to a central function of an ERISA
plan. Nonetheless, ERISA may preempt the CCPA’s requirement that
businesses disclose the type of information they collect to consumers because it
conflicts with a central reporting function associated with the administration of
the plan. 212
The CCPA’s private right of action for data breach will likely not be
preempted if a court finds that guarding against data breach constitutes an
“independent legal duty” 213 apart from ERISA’s fiduciary duty. Recent Ninth
Circuit litigation 214 supports existence of an independent legal duty. But it is
important to note that allowing consumers to sue ERISA plans or their
fiduciaries in response to data breach does not necessarily mean that plans will
ultimately be held responsible. If plan fiduciaries establish that they were not
negligent because they implemented reasonable procedures to guard against the
data breach, then they will not be held responsible. The possibility that ERISA
does not preempt the CCPA may spur plan sponsors and administrators to

209. See Sara H. Jodka, California’s Data Privacy Law: What It Is and How To Comply (A Step-byStep Guide), DICKINSON WRIGHT (July 2018), https://www.dickinson-wright.com/newsalerts/californias-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/82KD-LEH8].
210. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
211. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 3, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1810–11 (codified
as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(a) (2020)); Jodka, supra note 209.
212. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016) (“[R]eporting, disclosure,
and recordkeeping are central to, and an essential part of, the uniform system of plan administration
contemplated by ERISA.”). Note that Gobeille refers to disclosure to the state rather than disclosure to
individuals. Id. at 939. This may impact the preemption analysis here.
213. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).
214. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
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strengthen their cybersecurity protocols, which would guard them against tort
liability and better protect consumers.
Allowing the private right of action to escape preemption may increase
litigation against ERISA plan sponsors and administrators, but it will also
prompt ERISA plans to improve their data security protocols. Plaintiffs
bringing data breach claims face an uphill battle when trying to prove their
claims. 215 “[C]ircuits are split over whether individuals suffer a sufficiently
concrete injury and therefore have standing to sue a business that suffered a
breach when the individual’s sole injury is mere loss of data resulting from the
breach.” 216 If a plaintiff does meet the standing requirement, they must then
prove that the business negligently handled the data and that the business’s
negligence caused the breach. 217 The CCPA’s statutory private right of action
will likely result in an increase in costly litigation regardless of whether the
plaintiff prevails. However, litigation risk may incentivize plan sponsors and
administrators to improve their cybersecurity protocols. Absent amendments to
ERISA or additional federal regulation, applying the CCPA’s private right of
action to ERISA plans is one of the only ways to hold plans accountable for
maintaining adequate data security.
CONCLUSION
The impact of consumer privacy laws on ERISA plans remains uncertain
within the legal landscape of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. ERISA’s
silence regarding plans’ and plan administrators’ responsibilities within this
realm leaves the area ripe for judicial interpretation. Because ERISA does not
create an explicit duty for plans to reasonably safeguard data, and the CCPA
applies generally, courts should allow for provisions of the law that are not
directly connected to employee benefits administration to escape preemption.
This will undoubtedly impose additional administrative burdens on plans, but
allowing ERISA plans to avoid such regulation provides them with an unfair
“free pass” from regulation that is not benefits focused. If California intended
for ERISA plans to avoid CCPA compliance, it would have included them in
the legislative carve out. When deciding if ERISA preempts the CCPA, courts
should adhere to the traditional “presumption against preemption” and preempt
only aspects of the CCPA that relate to its core objective of uniform
administration of plan benefits.

215. See Moran, supra note 3, at 494.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 494–95. Proving causation becomes increasingly difficult because of the ubiquity of
data theft and breach caused by unknown sources. Id.
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